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Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century  
 
Fernando Estrada 
 
 
 
In Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century, whose Spanish edition has just been 
published by the Fondo de Cultura Economica is a publishing event in Mexico and Latin 
America. Marks a return to fundamental works of contemporary debate. Compared to the 
English version (Harvard University Press, 2014) this translation preserves the style of the 
original edition in French (Édition du Seuil, 2013). We recognize the tremendous work 
done by the team of translators and reviewers and say that this is a work that, like Keynes's 
general theory, represents a kind of Copernican revolution in contemporary public debate1. 
 
Piketty´s book contains four distinct parts. The first: Income and Capital, provides 
an entry relating to the classic problems of income, production and comparisons of growth; 
there illusions and realities between conventional theories and data are shown. The second 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For references on reactions to the book of Piketty we offer a reduced bibliography: In Spanish: Thomas 
Piketty, El capital en el siglo XXI, Traducción, Eliane Cazenave-Tapie Isoard, con la colaboraciónde 
Guillermo Cuevas, [Revisión de la traducción, Juan Carlos de Hoyos; Revisión ténica de la traducción, 
Gerado Esquivel, de la edición original  en francés: Le Capital au xx 1e siécle de Thomas Piketty, D.R. © 
Éditions du Seuil, 2013]. Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 2014, 664 pp. For reviews: El País, Madrid, 
18 de mayo, 2014;  Jesús Mota, “Cuando el pasado devora el porvenir”, El País, Madrid, 4 de diciembre; Luis 
Fernando Medina, “Se Viene el Gobierno Mundial”, Periódico El Espectador, Bogotá, 8 de diciembre de 
2014; Arlene B. Tickner, “Pensamiento creativo para un orden volátil”, Periódico El Espectador, 9 diciembre 
de 2014; Andrés Hoyos, “Piketty”, Periódico El Espectador, 25 de abril de 2014; Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Democracia en el siglo XXI, Periódico El Espectador, 6 de septiembre de 2014; Rafael Rivas, “Otra vez los 
impuestos”, Periódico El Espectador, 28 de agosto de 2014. José Fernando Isaza, “Concentración”, Periódico 
El Espectador, 28 de mayo de 2014. In english: Paul Krugman "That Old-Time Inequality Denial", N / T, 
May. 2014. Raul V. Fabella, "The Picketty Inequality in the Nash-bargained Social Contract", UP School of 
Economics, 2014; Odran Bonnet, Pierre-Henri Bono, Guillaume Chapelle et Etienne Wasmer, housing equity 
Does Contribute to inequality? A comment on Thomas Piketty's Capital in the 21st Century, Sciences Po 
Economics Discussion Papers, 2014; Francois Bonnet, Clement Theory. "Sociology and political science in 
the patrimonial society: implicaciones of Piketty's Capital. 2014 "; Bernardo Javier López, Félix López 
Martínez and Engelbert Stockhammer, "A Post-Keynesian Response to Piketty's" Fundamental Contradiction 
of Capitalism "; For additional positions, see Cowen and Stiglitz. Tyler Cowen, "Capital Punishment," 
Foreign Affairs, 2014, J. Stiglitz, "Phony Capitalism," Harper's Magazine , 2014; Solow and Milanovic 
provide articles and explanations that support the model Piketty, vér: RM Solow, "Thomas Piketty Is Right," 
New Republic , April 22, 2014; Branko Milanovic, "The Return of 'Patrimonial Capitalism': Review of 
Thomas Piketty's Capital in the 21st Century," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6974, July 2014 
;. Critical technical aspects of the model: Lawrence Summers, "The Inequality Puzzle," Democracy Journal , 
no. 31 (2014); Chris Giles, Financial Times ; John Cassidy, "Forces of Divergence," New Yorker , March 31, 
2014; Stefan Homburg, Critical Remarks on Piketty's 'Capital in the Twenty-first Century', Institute of Public 
Economics, Leibniz University of Hannover, Germany, 2014. 
deals with the dynamics in the relationship between capital and income in a vast historical 
overview that describes the metamorphosis of capital2. Compare the evolution of wealth 
from old Europe to the New World. The capital / income is analyzed jointly by Piketty by 
treatment of long-term continuous series and introduces an explanatory framework to 
observe the division between capital and labor in the XXI century. 
 
The third part analyzes the structure of inequalities. At first the complex links between 
inequality and concentration. Followed by a broad reflection on the dissociation between 
the world of wealth and poverty. The dilemmas corresponding roughly to inequality 
between labor income and capital derived properties33 . Then addresses the dichotomy 
between merit and long-term heritage, incorporating narrative as a resource that supports 
the analysis of magnitudes. Return to this point. The final section of the third part is 
devoted to critical review of global inequality of wealth in the XXI century. 
 
The fourth part is purposeful and suggests regulate capital in the XXI century, two 
problems reformulating economy since Ricardo and Marx have been linked to the public 
sphere: a social state and the progressive income tax. Likewise, the author offers his 
position on two ideas that have spurred criticism among those who have reviewed his work: 
a global tax on equity and debt. 
 
As regards the same Piketty his book is the result of 15 years of research (1998-
2013) essentially devoted to the historical dynamics of income and wealth4. Those who 
have read his previous work in articles and journals, see with this publication the partial 
completion of a work that began with Les Hauts Revenus en France au XX Siegle [High 
income in France in the twentieth century] and his colleagues Anthony Atkinson Oxford 
and Emmanuel Saenz of California. The originality of the project is to establish a platform 
covering about 27 countries and have gotten constitute the largest database available on the 
historical evolution of income inequality. The debate in the United States has certainly 
helped to give greater visibility to Piketty, among other aspects to exhibit the sharp increase 
in revenues richest 1 percent from the 70 In his chapters on progressive taxation knew 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For an extension of the database documented by Piketty, see: van Schaik, ABTM "With Piketty's laws 
replacement investment and depreciation". VoxEU, 2014. 
3 See Rajkamal Iyer and Manju Puri, "Understanding Bank Runs: The Importance of Depositor-Bank 
Relationships and Networks", American Economic Review 2012, 102 (4): 1414-1445. 
4 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, "Inequality in the long run", Science , Vol 344 Issue 6186, 2014; 
Facundo Alvaredo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez, "The Top 1 Percent in 
International and Historical Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives -Volume 27, Number 3-Summer 
2013-Pages 3-20. 
versions previous research on optimal taxation of income and capital5. 
 
The book also reflects a commitment to the social sciences, and in particular 
historiography. From the writings of F. Braudel in the early 60s and then M. Foucault 
during the decades of the 70s and 80s, the European tradition a few authors dedicated to 
probate files. What we find here is a historiographical exercise compared to similar efforts 
by Tocqueville mid-nineteenth century to understand the effects of the French Revolution. 
Piketty discovers that long period of time analyzing the wealth resulting capital presents 
unprecedented dimensions. From his historical research in notarial archives Piketty could 
see better multiple parallels also, and the differences-between the structure of existing 
property, or what he calls La Belle Époque and this shared by the companies at the 
beginning of XXI the century phenomenon. The collection of materials and overall project 
outcomes are in the database: World Top Incomes Database, available historical data and 
technical information for a thorough reading of the results. 
 
 
The problem. 
Piketty faces a subject of public debate originated during the decade of the 70s, when 
authors like Rawls and Cohen Buchanan among others stressed the academic return to the 
public sphere to confront the unequal distribution6. The particularity of capital in the XXI 
century if you compare it with the theory of justice Rawls (1971) is not only in scope, but 
the framework that serves a support. Say to summarize, in its simplest version, Rawls 
conceives the principles of distribution following a Kantian moral, and curious idea of a 
well-ordered society, while it Piketty ex post using the resource tax files compares the 
systematic mass of data in several countries with unequal distribution7. What difference, 
then both proposals? The test supported to warn that capitalism mechanically reproduce 
inequalities inherited while leaving without questioning the values that cemented the 
differences in income. That is, the model of wealth of, a well-ordered society to Rawls, not 
they had to settle with magnitudes that separate income of 1 percent of the richest and the 
rest of society. 
 
It should be emphasized that Piketty proceeding in a narrative tradition used as 
Balzac and Auden literary sources, and the novel serves an intuitive way to show the deep 
structure of inequality in the distribution of wealth globally. This appeal to intuition does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For a different version of the model Piketty, see: Evan Hillebrand, "The Global Distribution of Income in 
2050, World Development ", Vol 36, No. 5, pp.. 727-740, 2008; William J. Baumol, "On income distribution 
and growth", Journal of Policy Modeling 29 (2007) 545-548, 2007. 
6 John Rawls, The Theory of justice, 1971; Buchanan, James M., Tullock, Gordon, The Calculus of Consent: 
Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, 1962. 
7 Fred Campano, Dominick Salvatore, "Economic development and income distribution", Journal of Policy 
Modeling 29 (2007) 553-566. 
not seem casual; the author sustains that capital and its distributive forms are not a matter of 
expert economists, but everyone falls8. In other words the mechanisms used to reveal the 
enormous inequities created by the wealth should not be limited to conventional reservoir 
models and numerical arithmetic series9. However, Piketty brings the issue of sufficient 
methodological rigor distribution tools. And he is trying to establish regularities with 
extensive historical data sample numbers, years, decades and centuries crucial for economic 
history. 
But back to the core problem. We have noted that income inequality is not a new book, 
however since 1970 the evolution of inequalities has shown differences reviews10. The gap 
between the rich and the rest of society played a tendency toward what Ch. Tilly called 
desdemocracia. Theorists like Rawls, Nozick and Cohen had charted a course, but his 
message still amounted to generate an expanded towards universal audience debate. Since 
the economy, the alleged causes of inequality have been divergent: the minimum wage 
losses, union decline and lack of negotiation, outsourcing, globalization, replacement labor, 
technological shifts with tremendous changes in working life: up highly qualified and 
competent professionals ; and below, a majority unskilled, uneducated. On both fronts the 
set of responses to inequality by analysts remained limited. Nether the Theory of Justice 
Rawls and subsequent developments, or the revealing contradictions Nozick in Anarchy, 
State and Society, or polemical essays of Marxist Gerald Cohen, managed to explain the 
extreme threshold of inequality. What happened to the upward trend in income of 1 per cent 
compared to the rest of society? How coherently explain the levels of inequality in societies 
just experienced the rise of modern industrial capitalism?11. 
 
 
 
Response 
The Capital in the XXI century contains the answer to these questions. The key used by 
Piketty was to establish a framework where data could be interpreted from a different 
historical time. Indeed, being the capital (wealth) its main purpose was to observe their 
work time path compared between France, USA and UK. The accumulation of data series 
allowed Piketty track the issue of inequality to the mid-eighteenth century. The database he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Helen Scarborougha, Jeff Bennettb, "Estimating preferences intergenerational distribution", Ecological 
economics , 2008. 
9 Michael Grimm, "Does inequality in health impede economic growth?", Oxford Economic Papers, 1- 27, 
2011. 
10 Andreas Bergh, Therese Nilsson, "Do liberalization and globalization Increase income inequality ?, 
European Journal of Political Economy 26 (2010) 488-505, 2010. 
11 Patrick Moyes, "An extended Gini approach to inequality measurement", J Econ Inequal (2007) 5: 279-
303; Brice Magdalou · Patrick Moyes, "Deprivation, welfare and inequality", Journal Soc Choice Welfare, 
2008; a recommended items assessing capitalism compendium: Ali M. Kutan, Future of Capitalism: Is it 
failing ?, Economic Systems 34 (2010) 1-2. 
built with his team now provides differentiated information countries: India, Sweden, 
Holland, France, Germany and the United States. The patient work of the arithmetic capital 
accounting country was necessary because what mattered was to compare long periods in 
different geographical areas. It was necessary to know against what type of units you could 
contrast the wealth, say, between Britain and France during a given year. The 
methodological resource Piketty was to divide the wealth measured in local currency of that 
time between the national income, also measured in local currency at the time. The 
relationship between capital and income is translated in this way in "years". So using this 
technique compared can know that the total wealth in France in 1850 amounted to the 
equivalent of seven years' income, but in the case of the United States in 1950 only 
equivalent to four years of income. This resource compared with "years" between wealth 
and income was fundamental to compose the other chapters. There is a new methodology, 
but a historiographical resource that helped simplify large numbers and adapt to less 
complex units. 
 
Has underlined an ambiguity concerning two basic categories. Solow says that 
Piketty use "wealth" and "capital" as measurable terms. We know how to calculate the 
wealth of a person or institution: the value of all your assets and the total amount of debt is 
subtracted. (Values are market prices or, alternatively, some approximation.) The result, 
says Solow, is equity or net worth. At least in English, this is often called the capital of an 
institution or person. However, the capital has another meaning not at all equivalent: a 
"factor of production", an essential element in the production process as factories, 
machinery, equipment, office buildings or homes (producing "hosting services") . This 
meaning may differ from "wealth". In short, afrima Solow: there are assets that have value 
if and only if stem from the wealth, but produce nothing: artistic works, collections of 
precious metals, etc. (You could say that the pictures on the living room of a house 
produced "aesthetic services", but generally are not considered in national income.) 
 
What is significant in this review? The market value of the shares -the other side of 
the productive capital of a company- may change in unexpected ways and with greater 
rapidity than national income. Indeed, during a recession the relationship between wealth 
and income is likely to fall considerably, although it may happen that the productive capital 
has changed little or not at all. When working with long periods Piketty recommended not 
provide care to small inconsistencies between measures; so that with a little patience the 
resulting data are showing a clear pattern. In France and UK national capital remained 
relatively stable, about equivalent to seven times the national income between 1700 and 
1910, then fell sharply between 1910 and 1950, probably as a result of wars and the 
Depression, reaching a low of 2.5 in the UK and just under 3 in France. After the 
relationship between capital and income begins to rise again in both countries to achieve by 
2010 a little more than 5 in the UK and slightly less than 6 in France. This time span was 
different in the United States: starting just above 3 in 1770, rises to 5 in 1910, is slightly 
reduced in 1920, recovered to a peak between 5 and 5.5 in 1030, falling below 4 in 1950 
and again rises to 4.5 in 2010. 
 
The book teaches that wealth / income ratio in the US had been always lower than 
in Europe. And the main reason in the early years was that the land value increased less in 
open spaces of North America. Of course, there was more land, but it was too expensive. 
However, from the twentieth century, the low ratio between capital and income in the US 
probably began to reflect the highest level of productivity: a certain amount of capital could 
encourage greater production than in Europe. 
 
From another perspective, the weakness of the capital / income ratio in the United 
States reflects a fundamental difference in the structure of the inequalities in Europe. The 
fact that all of the assets represented just 3 years of national income in the United States, 
compared with more than 7 Europe meant specifically that the weight of the owners and the 
positions acquired in the past was less important than the New World. It was possible, with 
some years of work and production limit initial differences in wealth between social 
groups, or at least reach them faster than in Europe. This is the balance of the relationship 
between capital / income that Piketty closes the first part of his book. Among the countries 
compared with data and tax records the relationship of wealth and income has been 
increasing since 1950, returning to the levels of the nineteenth century. The author believes 
that this increase will continue in this century, as seen in the following chapters. 
 
What type of bond determines the long-run relationship between capital and 
income? Piketty adopts the formula: b = s / g. And illustrated as follows. Specifically, if a 
country saves annually 12% of your income if your income by 2% per year, and if the 
initial capital stock is equal to six years of income, then the capital stock increase by 2% 
annually, ie exactly the same rate as national income grows; hence the capital / income ratio 
stable. However, if the capital stock is less than six years of income, savings equal to 12% 
of income will lead to the capital stock increase more than 2% (ie faster than income) such 
that the capital / income ratio will increase to its equilibrium level. In all cases, according 
Piketty, the capital / income in the long term relationship tends towards equilibrium b = s / 
g (I eventualemte increased over natural resources), provided however that the long-term 
asset prices evolve in Likewise average consumer prices. 
 
Now for the issue of consumption and income. Think of someone who earns r 
percent per year (temporarily excluding taxes). If you part 1 percent rich are likely to 
consume only a fraction of their income. The rest is saved and accumulated their wealth so 
that their income will increase nearly r percent each year. Savings deposits with annual 
interest are part of their profits. It is the central theme and the powerful contribution 
Piketty. While the rate of return exceeds the growth rate of income of the rich will grow 
faster than income resulting from the workers. Or better, riches do not show a 
compensatory effect that reduces the total share capital. This trend figures for three 
consecutive centuries, with 1 per cent to maintain their dominance over the rest of society, 
do not describe institutional failures, they are mainly based on the ability of the economy to 
absorb increasing amounts of capital without substances falling rates of return. It is the 
devouring this past. 
 
A phenomenon of corona type Mateo explanation in this part. A rich such a system 
is given a wealth and the poor, they have, are removed. Savings rates derived from work 
tend to be low, and the accumulation of capital in the hands of workers and employees. 
Instead the interests of wealth are increasing. If we compare the profitability of wealth 
relative to wealthier group worker savings are meager, and this mechanism does not offset 
the expected increase in inequality. But there is another dark line between these underlying 
trends related to time. If existing accumulations of wealth tend to grow faster than labor 
income, chances are that participation in inherited wealth increases relative to the fortunes 
earned by merit. Amid these conditions will not cease to exist entrepreneurs and innovators, 
investors and managers, artists and athletes who will benefit being in the shadow of renters. 
However, unbridled inflation or lower growth of the economy can spoil such stories. The 
corollary to the phenomenon of the Matthew effect is that the concentration of wealth and 
its ability to grow will encourage more to heredity than wealth related merit. 
 
 
The description of the relationship between the distribution of income and wealth, 
makes Piketty from an intuitive arithmetic; we found no summary statistics or complex 
probabilistic series. For example, the percentages of 1 percent (tenth or above that 1 
percent) is equivalent here to 10 percent; the next 40 percent, half (the middle class) 
corresponds to 40 percent among the top decile and the bottom half. Piketty called "middle 
class" 40 percent of the population located between the top decile and the average which is 
above the population. As we see it is a relatively ambiguous conceptual unity; the so-called 
"middle class" without reaching high income equity, income also suffers from the extreme 
need of the poorest in society. Yet it is an achievement of the author show that such 
differences exist. It is part of the method used by Piketty, who summarizes the complex 
data are not always comparable and are described in chapters summarizing their work. 
 
Capital distribution is uneven, often from birth12. In the US, 10 percent of the top 
decile owns about 70 percent of all wealth, and half of it belongs to 1 percent; 40 percent 
below (the middle class) has about a quarter of total capital (mainly in inmoviliaria 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Anet Currie, "Inequality at Birth: Some Causes and Consequences", American Economic Review: Papers & 
Proceedings 2011, 101: 3, 1-22. 
housing); population 50 has almost not at all, barely 5 percent of the total. The point is that 
the investments of the middle class housing are part of a relatively new phenomenon in the 
economy. Unlike the United States economic policies in Europe show a more egalitarian 
trend: the 1 percent owns 25 percent of capital; the middle class 35 percent. The historical 
development has been positive. In his book The Old Regime and the Revolution 
Tocqueville describes a very poor, middle class in these countries during the fourteenth to 
nineteenth centuries. Since that time the successive changes in demography and urban 
migration gave a solid foundation for a more inclusive society. 
 
If in the XXI Century accept such an extraordinary concentration of property and 
wealth would be returning to a similar mentality that had the world in the fourteenth 
century. You might note, however, that capital income is more concentrated than wealth 
itself since, as Piketty says, the magnitudes of wealth tend to increase according to their 
larger size. Part of this advantage depends on the development of an economy of scale 
where investors also have privileged access to information and positions of power in 
institutions where decisions are made. Income from work tend to be more dispersed than 
the concentration of wealth. Piketty these differences observed mainly in the United States: 
1 percent earns about 12 percent of total labor income, 9 percent earn below 23 percent; the 
middle class gets about 40 percent and the bottom half receives a quarter of such income. 
Again, the conditions in Europe are similar: 10 percent charged a little less and the 
remaining two groups slightly. The revelations documented by Piketty not discover 
something original, but critically expose the silent extreme inequality over three 
consecutive centuries. 
 
One of the critical aspects of inequality related to income are obtaining higher 
wages13. About 60 percent of revenue from "1 percent" in the United States come from 
earnings, and only when we reached the top tenth of 1 percent of capital revenues begin to 
predominate: 70 percent of revenues hundredth of the top 1 percent originate in the capital. 
This story is repeated in other countries. France for example, has a similar rate of wage 
income at all levels, but there are also very high salaries. This aspect is relatively new in the 
economy. In the 1960s, the top 1 percent of earners cashed 5 percent of all earnings. The 
increase in this percentage has been constant until today when the top 1 percent of earners 
receive between 10 and 12 percent of all wages. However, the involvement of the highest 
salaries in the case of France remained stable at 6 percent until recently. In short, 
apparently the development of extreme inequality at the top of the wage distribution is 
American. Piketty and its working group have done a thorough job in tax returns between 
those recoben high incomes in the United States. The work of N. Taleb was also revealing 
about this phenomenon scandalous concentration of capital between those who Piketty calls 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Donghoon Leea, Kenneth I. Wolpin, "Accounting for wage and employment Changes in the US from 1968 
to 2000: A dynamic model of labor market equilibrium", Journal of Econometrics 156 (2010) 68-85 
"superejecutivos". These characters represent large corporations (particularly in the 
financial industry sector)14. 
 
Counting or not with the option to purchase shares, large wage income become 
wealth or future income from it. The rise of superejecutivos, especially in America, was the 
promoter likewise the enormous inequities that nation in income. A phenomenon hitherto 
little studied, although Piketty believes that this is a problem fueled by corporate patronage 
and power relations between large companies. The "thread" in the companies allows 
payments and bonuses related merits of its own executives. The peculiarity in the evolution 
of such wage increases is that they can overcome the stops in the highest income deciles. 
Also shown as a merit award superejecutivos youth who are good reasons to formalize their 
fortunes. These bonuses do not count as earned income, which means a high stimulus that 
governments and tax bodies should be estimated. It is however a problem related to the 
propensity to encourage large companies as a goal. The remarkable thing is Piketty study 
showing the effects of such deviations in the distribution of capital and related 
inequalities15. 
 
Piketty links the issue of income superejecutivos with equity capital and 
profiteering. The profits of this new generation of rich class non-labor or pension savings; 
are not employees or dividends from independent businesses. The process is devastating. 
An advanced system slow down in the productive economy and lower population level in 
developed countries, contrasts with higher rates of return on capital and low growth rates; 
the book describes similarities between capital and revenue century regarding the 
conditions were during the nineteenth century. In some cases the share of capital in the 
economy of countries far exceeds net income in national income. Inherited wealth has 
evolved acquiring new outfits in financial markets; however, this is kind of the wealth that 
does not depend on the work and promoting high peaks of inequality in society. The two 
trends addressed by Piketty to curb this situation: (a) high inflation and tensions in the 
balance between diminishing returns and (b) technological progress. Both trends are 
described by the author as expectations of the XXI century. 
 
What to do about this situation of inequality? What policy statements follow from 
the diagnostic Piketty offer? ¿Irreversible conditions created by capital and its winners were 
treated? Piketty's proposal targets a progressive tax on wealth; to expand to all countries 
and impose barriers to evasion in tax havens. The second idea is unrealistic. While 
acknowledging that a global tax is difficult to think that it is possible to implement a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random House 
and Penguin. 2007.  
15 Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein, "Inequality and institutions", The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
August 2007, 89 (3): 454-465. 
regional tax assets in developed countries in Europe and the United States. The tax riches in 
mind is to 0 percent on incomes below the million euros, 1 percent for wealth between one 
and five million and 2 percent for riches that exceed 2 percent of millions of euros . It is an 
annual tax and not a casual lien or only once. Piketty believes that implementing this tax 
could generate revenues equivalent to 2 percent of GDP; and the funds raised would be 
used or distributed by an agreed formula. 
 
However, the recommendation has more projection is the progressive tax. In 
countries like Colombia (and in general countries with medium levels of development), a 
tax of this kind calls for measures with high levels of transparency and independent 
monitoring mechanisms with respect to financial institutions and corporations alike. The 
fourth part of the book extends detail on the roles that governments in Europe should be 
taken into account. The progressive tax can offer lower difficulties from the legal point of 
view, its implementation is a matter of improving both information systems and the control 
of evasion. 
 
However, the proposed tax on capital as progressive taxation are not the main 
objective of his book. The issue is the difference between the growth rate and the net return 
on capital. The chapters develop numerous data elements that make up the growing 
dynamics of inequality whereby the rich get richer. A tax on capital, supplemented by a 
system of progressive taxation rates, decrease the difference between the returns on capital 
and growth of countries. 
 
Piketty has stripped with evidence the effects of inherited inequalities. It is not a 
process of skills and individual incentives in capitalist societies; is not wealth or savings 
achieved through private investment. Nor is the wealth derived from technological 
innovation. Capital is related to a structural phenomenon of disadvantages among a 
majority low-income and 1 percent rich heritage. 
 
 
 
Corollary on the progressive tax16 
Tax policy creates obligations to individuals and organizations. Traditionally, governments 
have sought two purposes with taxes. First, obtain resources to finance spending on public 
goods and services. Second, change the relationship between the factors of production. In 
this regard have been very influential, for example, claims George (1881) on the positive 
impact it would have on production by 100% tax differential rent. To Hotelling (1931) 
taxes are the most suitable for the pacing mining tool. Recently, the IDB has stressed the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 These endnotes are part of a shared Jorge I González on the progressive tax Hayek and receiving Brennan / 
Buchanan work. 
same (Corbacho, Fretes and Lora 2013): taxes are not only to raise, but must be understood 
as tools for development. 
 
The progressive tax system relates to a situation in which the rate increases with 
income and purchasing power. In most income and property tax systems in the 
contemporary world are progressive in nature: at the margin, the rate increases as income 
increases17. It is also possible to have a tax expense that is progressive, applying a similar 
income criterion: the escalation occurs when the tax rate increases as consumption 
expenditures are over18. 
 
If the tax policy is complex, so is the policy of redistribution (Estrada, 2010a). The 
search for equality can result from a deliberate fiscal policy measures that touch the income 
and expenses, or may be an "accidental" effect of economic dynamics are combined. In the 
first case, it must be remembered that the net balance each family makes to the state. 
Citizens pay taxes, but at the same time, receive subsidies. In the fiscal accounts of the 
countries this ratio is not included. Strictly speaking, progressivity should be examined 
considering the individual's situation before and after taxes (local and national) and 
subsidies (local and national). This is the intent of the call Sarkozy Commission (Stiglitz, 
Sen and Fitoussi 2010), for the proposition that the quality of life of people is analyzed 
taking into account their real purchasing power, and this depends largely on the net balance 
between taxes and subsidies19 . To Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, state intervention that 
contributes to equity is desirable to improve the situation of the poorest people. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The marginal increase may be weak (the second derivative of the rate with respect to income is negative) or 
strong (the second derivative is positive). The diversity of tax forms is manifold. See, for example, Macmillan 
Dictionary of Modern Economics , published under the direction of David W. Pearce, Macmillan Press Ltd. 
1992. 
18 One of the most celebrated works in defense of progressive tax tax has been the work of Edwin RA 
Seligman: Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice , 1894. Seligman develops the history of progressive 
taxation and an assessment of the theory from Wagner, Paine socialists, Guicciardini, Marshall, Licht; the 
theory of profit (tax payment is based on the benefit received), which contrasts proportionality and 
progressivity, the theory of service costs and subsequent decay. Based on a wide range of thinkers: Hobbes, 
Pufendorf, Turgot, Proudhon, Sartorius and Braun, Seligman identifies the favorable line to the proportional 
tax by upholding the principle benefit, then questioning from early social and economic philosophy Gandillot, 
Bentham, Robespierre, Vauthier. The Highlights of the work of Seligman, are found in the third part where 
does an application of progressive principle fiscal power in the United States and Spain. This is a fundamental 
work to understand the historical particularities of SFP (Spanish translation: The progressive tax in theory 
and in practice ., Victor I. Trad Paret, Madrid, 1913 [in the Library of the External University of Colombia , 
Ranked: 336 293 464 S i, ex.1]). 
19 From an accounting point of view, there is much discussion on how it should allocate the services offered 
by the state and have no direct monetary valuation. 
These authors Thomas Piketty position adds, but it comes from a privileged status. The 
Capital in the XXI century has brought together to compare historical and wealth 
inequalities, series; but its author has also led to a theory, data remarkable extent in the 
debate between economics, social sciences and society. 
